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The 2014 presidential election in Turkey 
The election of the 12th President of Turkey was remarkably different than the elections 
of the previous 11. For the first time in the history of the Republic, the head of the state was 
directly elected by ordinary people rather than chosen by their representatives in the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi). On 10 August 2014, the 
incumbent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won a simple majority of votes in the first 
round of the election and became the president for the next five years.  
1. Background   
The election took place at the end of the seven-year term of the outgoing President 
Abdullah Gül, a co-founder of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, AKP) led by Erdoğan. Erdoğan’s AKP had won yet another victory earlier in the 
same year with the 2014 Turkish local elections, which were held on 30 March. For many 
voters and parties alike, this was a clear forecast for the presidential election to follow in five 
months’ time.  Nevertheless, the background to the 2014 presidential election goes far 
beyond those five months; as far as the previous presidential elections held in 2007. 
The 2007 presidential elections proved to be a highly problematic process that ‘triggered 
a deep systematic crisis’ in Turkish politics (Bacik, 2008, p.377). With its more than enough 
seats in the assembly, the AKP should have had no arithmetic problem electing its own 
candidate, then the Foreign Minister Gül. However, there was a very tense political 
atmosphere outside the assembly as secular groups and elites protested against the idea of 
having an Islamist president. A controversial decision from the Constitutional Court declaring 
the first round of voting in the assembly invalid and a statement from the General Staff of the 
Turkish Armed Forces intervening in the elections brought the election process to a deadlock. 
Although the assembly eventually elected Gül as the president, that same year the AKP 
introduced a constitutional referendum on electoral reform to avoid future reoccurrences. The 
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approval of the reform meant that future presidents were to be elected by popular vote. 
Moreover, the reform included two further related amendments to the constitution: the 
presidential term is reduced from seven to five years while presidents are allowed to seek re-
election for a second term in office. However, it was not immediately clear whether these 
new amendments applied to Gül’s presidency, who was elected for a single term of seven 
years, or to other previous presidents who were still alive. Indeed, many aspects of the 
upcoming presidential election stayed unclear until the enactment of the Law on Presidential 
Elections in 2012. An important aspect of this legislation was the declaration that Gül’s term 
would last not five but seven years, which was in effect the declaration of the year of the 
upcoming presidential election as 2014. It also stated that the single-term limit of the pre-
reform era still applies to the previous presidents and therefore that they cannot be nominated 
for what would be their second term. This part of the legislation was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court, making it possible for the previous presidents, and most importantly for 
outgoing President Gül, to be nominated for the 2014 presidential election. 
The Supreme Election Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) decided to hold the first round of 
the election on 10 August 2014. If no candidate was elected on that first ballot, a second 
round would be held on 24 August 2014. The political atmosphere in the summer of 2014 
surrounding the presidential election was nothing like in 2007 — there was no visible 
intention to prevent the election process from taking its course. The AKP had been in power 
since 2002, winning every single popular vote in the meantime, be it the local and national 
elections or the referenda. They had the power and the time to change the bureaucracy for 
their liking. Having a president, who appoints high-level bureaucrats, from their own party 
for the last seven years had definitely helped in this sense. Besides, a considerable number of 
ex-bureaucrats were now in jail for allegedly attempting different coups against the AKP 
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governments. Therefore the state elites, who played an important role in the 2007 presidential 
elections, were not the same actors in 2014. 
2. Electoral system 
The presidential election system is a two-round voting system. A candidate needs an 
absolute majority of votes to win the election. If no candidate achieves this in the first round, 
then all but the two candidates receiving the most votes are eliminated before a second round 
takes place on the second Sunday after the first vote. The second round of voting guarantees 
that one of the candidates wins the majority of the votes as there are only two candidates 
running.  
Despite losing the right to elect the president, the members (MPs) in the Grand National 
Assembly continue to have a central role in the election process. The Law on Presidential 
Elections subjects the nominations to the backing of MPs where each party can propose only 
one candidate.
1
 More specifically, standing as a candidate requires signatures by at least 20 
MPs from the 550-seat assembly. In theory, this limits the maximum number of candidates to 
27. However, the actual number of candidates is likely to be much lower in practice and 
indeed lower than in many other presidential elections in parliamentary systems around the 
world. On the one hand, smaller parties with less than 20 seats cannot nominate their own 
candidate. On the other hand, in an assembly with a relatively high party discipline, MPs 
from larger parties are likely to back the candidate that their leadership proposes.  
All Turkish citizens over the age of 18 residing abroad as well as in Turkey are eligible to 
vote. There are over 2.5 million registered voters outside Turkey (see Table 2), who have 
long had the right to vote in Turkish elections provided that they go to the polls set up at the 
customs offices. However, this is a right used by only those who happen to visit Turkey 
during the election period at the customs, which starts approximately a month ahead of the 
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 Parties can propose a joint candidate if their total share of votes in the previous general elections are above 10 
per cent — the threshold to secure any parliamentary representation.  
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election day, resulting in a very low turnout. Allowing the citizens abroad to cast their votes 
in Turkish embassies and consulates had been on the political agenda since 2007, but a series 
of constitutional and administrative challenges delayed its application (Kesgin, 2012). The 
2014 presidential election happened to be the first occasion where the overseas voting system 
was in place. Voting took place in 103 consulates in 54 countries with a prior appointment.  
3. Candidates  
Beside the AKP who had been governing the country since 2002, there were three other 
parliamentary party groups in opposition in the Grand National Assembly in 2014: 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), National Action Party (Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi, MHP), and the Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, 
HDP). All eyes were on the leadership of these four parties before the candidate nomination 
process as they each had enough numbers of MPs to nominate their own candidate for the 
presidential election. However, it became clear after the 2014 Turkish local elections that no 
opposition party could realistically compete with the AKP on their own.  
There were three contenders in the election. The first move came from the leaderships 
of CHP and MHP in cooperation, who proposed Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as their joint 
candidate on 16 July 2014. Despite being a successful academic and diplomat who previously 
served as the Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation among other 
positions, İhsanoğlu was very little-known nationally. So much so that he had a lot to explain 
even to the CHP and MHP voters, from how to pronounce his unusual name to his 
understanding of Islam and democracy. Some CHP MPs were unconvinced by İhsanoğlu and 
therefore did not sign for his nomination whereas he received the full support of the MHP 
parliamentary group. During the campaign process, several other political parties across the 
political spectrum that do not have any representation in the assembly also announced their 
support for İhsanoğlu. 
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Nevertheless, the HDP, a party of pro-Kurdish and left-wing movements, did not join 
this block of parties. Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-leader of the party, was nominated as the 
second candidate with full support from his MPs on 30 July 2014. Unlike İhsanoğlu, 
Demirtaş was a well-known political figure in Turkey. He first entered the Grand National 
Assembly in 2007 and was re-elected again in 2011, both times as an independent MP to 
bypass the 10 per cent threshold – an election strategy used by the Kurdish candidates in 
Turkey (Bacik 2004, 2008; Kesgin, 2012). Demirtaş had been the co-leader of these 
independently elected MPs since 2010 although the name of their party changed more than 
once due to closure by the Constitutional Court or strategic reasons. The switch from the 
Peace and Democratic Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) to the HDP before the 2014 
presidential elections was one of these strategic moves to create a party that would mobilise a 
larger population than just the Kurds. Several left and extreme left parties with no electoral 
signicifance declared their support for Demirtaş. 
The AKP delayed the announcement of their candidate as long as possible, leading to 
speculations about the negotiations between the two potential candidates of the AKP – the 
outgoing President Abdullah Gül and the incumbent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
Meanwhile, the party whips collected signatures from all of their MPs without letting them 
know whom they were actually nominating for the presidential election. A few days after Gül 
publically ruled his candidacy out, the AKP announced its leader Erdoğan as the third 
candidate in the presidential election on 1 July 2014. Erdoğan, a former Mayor of Istanbul, 
had been dominating Turkish politics ever since he became the Prime Minister of Turkey in 
2003. An internal AKP regulation limits the number of terms that its members can serve as 
MPs to three, which would apply to Erdoğan in 2015. However, the reason behind Erdoğan’s 
wish to become the president, a position that he effectively refused in 2007 by nominating 
Gül instead, could not be a party regulation that he could have easily changed. A more 
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plausible reason would be the changing nature of the Turkish presidency that he envisages as 
a result of the change in the election system discussed above. The only other party, out of the 
almost one hundred registered in Turkey, to declare support for Erdoğan was the Motherland 
Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP).
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4. Campaign 
The official campaign period, as announced and regulated by the Supreme Election 
Council, ran from 11 July to 9 August 2014. The first part of this campaign calendar 
coincided with Ramadan, the holy month of fasting for the vast majority of the population in 
Turkey. İhsanoğlu decided not to hold election rallies until after Ramadan and instead 
concentrated on smaller events for a while. His first election rally was only a week before the 
election day. Demirtaş and Erdoğan did have rallies throughout their campaign, which they 
tailored around the fasting time and the heat of the summer season. Beside the mass election 
rallies, all three candidates engaged in other forms of conventional campaigning activities. 
Nevertheless, a live televised debate among the candidates never materialised despite the 
calls from İhsanoğlu. 
An important controversy of this period was about the campaign resources. The 
candidates were allowed to accept personal donations to fund their campaigning activities – 
another novelty for elections in Turkey. However, as Table 1 shows, there was a gulf between 
the funds raised by the candidates. At the end of the campaign period, the donations to 
Erdoğan were almost 6 times higher than the total donations made to İhsanoğlu and Demirtaş 
together. Despite being the joint candidate of the two largest opposition parties, İhsanoğlu did 
not have the kind of partisan support that the other two candidates enjoyed as the leaders of 
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 The majority of these parties do not regularly contest elections due to lack of organisation, resources, and voter 
base. The last time the ANAP contested the general elections was in 2002, when it failed to win any seat in the 
Assembly. 
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their own parties. In addition to being a party leader, with the approval from the Supreme 
Election Council, Erdoğan remained as the Prime Minister throughout the campaign. He was 
heavily criticised by the opposition for misusing his position and government resources for 
electoral purposes – an accusation denied by the Erdoğan campaign. For example, at the 
centre of this particular controversy was the coverage of the candidates by the national public 
broadcaster of Turkey (TRT), which is funded by the taxpayer and legally bound to be 
impartial. However, their coverage was highly biased towards Erdoğan as also shown in 
Table 1. 
     Table1: 
                                   Donations and public broadcasting received by each candidate. 
 
Candidate 
 
 
Donations
a 
 Public 
Broadcasting
b 
  
Erdoğan 55,260,778 Liras 
($25,489,288) 
 
 559 minutes 
İhsanoğlu 8,500,000 Liras 
($3,920,664) 
 
 137 minutes 
Demirtaş 1,213,000 Liras 
($559,501) 
 18 minutes 
a
 Denotes the total amount of self-reported donations on 9 August 
2014. Source: Hürriyet Daily News (2014a). The figures in brackets 
are the approximate values in U.S. dollar on that day as calculated by 
the author. 
b 
Denotes the total number of
 
 minutes devoted to the coverage of each 
candidate by the public broadcaster’s news channel TRT Haber 
between 29 June and 10 July 2014. Source: Hürriyet Daily News 
(2014b). 
 
 The prominent issues of the earlier local elections, such as the Gezi Park protests or 
the government corruption scandal from 2013, featured in this campaign albeit to a lesser 
extent.  The Kurdish-Turkish peace process and the 2014 Gaza–Israel conflict were also part 
of the debate as the ongoing issues that coincided with the campaign. The future of the 
presidency as an office in the political system of Turkey, however, was probably the key 
aspect of the campaign. Previously as chosen by the MPs, Turkish presidents played a largely 
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ceremonial role in the parliamentary system by staying away from day-to-day partisan 
politics. Now that the president was to be elected by the people for the first time, Erdoğan 
declared that it would not be the low-profile business as usual at the presidential palace and 
that he would continue to play an ‘active role’ in politics as a president.  In contrast, both 
İhsanoğlu and Demirtaş vowed to stick by the legal and traditional frameworks around the 
role of presidency, pointing out the fact that nothing but the election method had changed in 
the constitution.  
5. Results 
For many, the real question to be answered on 10 August 2014 was not who would 
win the election but whether Erdoğan would win an absolute majority of votes in the first or 
second round. Table 2 presents the results of the election, showing that Erdoğan won the 
election in the first round with 51.8 per cent of the votes. This is 8.4 percentage points higher 
than the overall share of votes that his party achieved in local elections earlier in the same 
year. In the same local elections, the total vote share of the CHP and MHP was 43.2 per cent. 
Their joint candidate İhsanoğlu came second in the presidential election with 38.4 per cent of 
the votes. Finally, Demirtaş earned the support of the 9.8 per cent of the voters – 3.2 per cent 
more than what the BDP and HDP won in the most recent elections.  
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Table 2 
Results of the presidential election in Turkey, 10 August 2014. 
Candidates 
 
 Homeland  Customs  Overseas  Total 
Votes % Votes % Votes % Votes % 
Erdoğan  20,670,826 51.6  185,444 62.7  143,873 62.3  21,000,143 51.8 
İhsanoğlu  15,434,167 38.5  89,070 30.1  64,483 27.9  15,587,720 38.4 
Demirtaş  
 
3,914,359 9.7  21,107 7.1  22,582 9.8  3,958,048 9.8 
 
Other Results  
Invalid Votes 
Total Votes 
 734,140 
40,753,492 
  1,719 
297,340 
  1,857 
232,795 
  737,716 
41,283,627 
 
Electorate  52,894,115   -   2,798,726   55,692,841  
Turnout   77.0      8.3   74.1 
Source: Supreme Election Council (2014a, 2014b, 2014c). 
 
The overall turnout of 74.1 per cent was lower than in any parliamentary election held 
since the introduction of compulsory voting in 1983. Perhaps the most surprising result of the 
elections was the single digit turnout rate of the voters abroad. Despite all the legal and 
administrative efforts, only 8.3 per cent of the Turkish citizens abroad went to the polls at the 
consulates, for which many blamed the compulsory appointment system. Overall, as this was 
the first election if its kind, it is hard to interpret the lower-than-normal turnout at this stage. 
On the one hand, it could be a result of characteristics particular to the election held on 10 
August 2014, such seasonal factors, voter fatigue, or the one-sided nature of the competition 
(Rallings, Thrasher, & Borisyuk, 2003). The election was held only five months after the 
previous ones and in the middle of a hot summer when an important portion of the population 
is traditionally away from their voting districts for their holiday. On top of all this, the result 
of the election was known not to be a close call. On the other hand, it could be the start of a 
trend that reflects a perception of the presidential election as less important than 
parliamentary elections. Low turnout is one of the characteristics of such ‘second-order 
elections’ irrespective of the particularities of the elections day (Reif & Schmitt, 1980).  
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6. Aftermath  
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was officially sworn in as the 12th Turkish president on 28 
August 2014. Since then, just like he declared before the election, Erdoğan has been a 
different president than the previous ones in the recent history of Turkey. Despite the fact that 
former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has replaced Erdoğan as the AKP leader and 
prime minister, the President Erdoğan calls cabinet meetings – a constitutional right that 
previous presidents hardly ever used. As well as this, he continues to hold mass rallies where 
he openly criticises the opposition parties and their leaders while at the same time claiming to 
be impartial to all parties. In these and other public occasions, Erdoğan often brings the topic 
around to the arguments for a change from parliamentary to presidential system.  
The 2014 presidential election has initially unsettled the relatively stable political system 
in Turkey. Will these initial waves lead to a complete overhaul of the system? Regardless of 
the answer, the 2014 Turkish presidential election is likely to be remembered as a benchmark 
in the future. 
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